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What Transcends the Nation?
The invocation of “the people” as the foundation of the nation state raises the 
specter of “belonging” and involves a staging of the essence of the nation. In 
India, religion is taken to be the essence of the nation within the framework of 
hindutva ideology. Muslims are regarded not only as secondary citizens but also 
as enemy targets for national mobilization. The sovereignty of the Indian state 
thus necessarily depends on violence directed at the Pakistani national outside 
of its borders and at the Muslim population residing within.
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What transcends the nation? Nothing, perhaps, since the nation itself is transcendental. This is not immediately evident, since nationalisms are 
considered immanent and secular in the sense that their reference point is “the 
people,” not God. Such a secular “this-worldly” reference is modern, becomes 
dominant in the nineteenth century with Max Weber (1993, 1) and others, and 
affects everyone everywhere down to the present. It frames religion and not the 
other way around. “We, the people” (the first phrase in the preamble of the US 
constitution) is not stating an unambiguous, empirical fact but a declaration, a 
performative utterance in John Langshaw Austin’s (1962) sense, which produces 
a metaphysical entity. Liberal political theory following John Rawls (1971) sees the 
nation as the collective will of autonomous, rational subjects who keep references to 
transcendental truth out of political deliberation. Nevertheless, nationalist ideology 
portrays the nation as an unassailable, transcendental essence, transcending personal 
and regional identity and requiring its members to die for it if need be. Who will be 
defined as “the people” and who will not be is the most important question that 
needs an answer in nationalist discourse and studies. Religion is potentially a source 
of national identification besides ethnicity, language, and history. Religion needs to 
be nationalized, made part of national identity. Crucial in this is the development of 
tools of enumeration and censuses that produce majorities and minorities. Religious 
divisions have always been political, even in the premodern era, but they acquire a 
new salience as a result of nationalism, for they can be transcended in nationalism 
by a politics of reconciliation and inclusion, but they can also be reinforced through 
political mobilization. Often one finds a combination of ethnicity and religion, and 
one can speak about the political process of the ethnicization of religion or the 
religionization of ethnicity.
In recent comments on secularism beyond the West, the philosopher Charles 
Taylor (2015, 14–15) has argued that the rise of the nation state and the mobilization 
around a national identity has been crucial for developing secular modernity. He 
argues that a national society becomes “reflexive,” in analogy with the reflexive 
individual, in taking a critical stance to itself and devising ways of self-transformation. 
Taylor distinguishes three important aspects of the reflexive nation state, what he 
calls the three D’s: Disenchantment; Disciplines, in the sense of self-examination and 
self-control, leading to the autonomous, reflexive individual, the appropriate citizen 
of a democratic reflexive society; and Disembedding, the process whereby people 
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acquire an identity that is independent of any particular social order or community. 
According to Taylor, “we become modern by breaking out of ‘superstition.’ The 
enchanted world was one in which spirits and magical forces could cross a porous 
boundary and shape our lives, psychic and physical” (ibid.). In Taylor’s view, modern 
persons are now “buffered” selves, no longer porous selves. This line of reasoning 
obviously follows from Weber’s notion of Entzauberung (disenchantment), a specific 
argument about secularization that focuses on rationality (Lehmann 2009).
In my view, Weber, Taylor, and a whole tradition of enlightenment thinkers miss 
the fact that modernity itself has aspects that could be called “magical” (Meyer 
and Pels 2003). Not long after Weber died in 1920, Germany saw the rise of an ultra-
nationalist movement that did anything but disenchant society. One of its striking 
aspects was a mobilization of society to grasp state power. After capturing the state, 
a thorough rationalization of its bureaucratic apparatus was realized to execute 
the orders in a state hierarchy that had synthesized state institutions and party 
organizations. Italy, Spain, and Portugal went through a similar process, which also 
characterized the Communist bloc. There is nothing entzaubert (disenchanted), so to 
speak, about this. It is precisely authoritarian state power that could be called magical.
Sovereignty and violence
The question I wish to raise is perhaps not so much how authoritarian or fascist the 
Indian state is, which is difficult to measure, but how it treats its minorities and how 
violent it is. Contrary to liberal political theory that argues that the modern nation 
state is based on democratic choices that are made by “buffered selves” (auto-
nomous, rational actors) and that passion should be outside of politics, I want to 
suggest that the sovereign nation state is built on the arbitrary use or containment 
of violence. For Weber, this is, of course, the state’s monopoly of legitimate violence. 
Legitimacy, however, is itself a circular product of violence. If the state is built on 
violence, its legitimacy must also be built on violence. Undoubtedly, the rule of law is 
crucial, but the construction of the legal system and the application of the law is part 
of a political process.
Nationalism definitely uses founding myths, ritual and symbolic politics, 
exorcism, and the unpredictable behavior of charismatic leadership (all also 
elements of religion) in its mobilization of people. The magic of the nation state is 
often interpreted as populism, but one needs to see that the nation state itself by 
definition rests on the idea that the people legitimize the state. The question then 
becomes who “the people” really are and, more importantly, who does not belong. 
What, therefore, is the relation between minorities and majorities that are ethnically 
and/or religiously defined?
The sovereignty of the state thus does not only depend on its recognition by other 
states but also on the recognition of its power within the nation. That recognition 
ultimately rests on the state’s ultimate ability to assert itself violently both internally 
and externally. The state itself is, of course, a reification of itself, and power is unevenly 
distributed. There are specific sites or events at which sovereignty is asserted, for 
example courts, election campaigns, or urban slums. It is the performance of power 
22 | Asian Ethnology 80/1 • 2021
through violence, spectacular or secret, that is crucial to sovereignty (Hansen and 
Stepputat 2005, 3).
Achille Mbembe (2003, 11) has argued that, “the ultimate expression of sovereignty 
resides, to a large degree, in the power and the capacity to dictate who may live and 
who must die” (ibid.). Mbembe’s concern is “those figures of sovereignty whose 
central project is not the struggle for autonomy but the generalized instrumentalization 
of human existence and the material destruction of human bodies and populations” (2003, 14, 
italics added). Mbembe takes his cue from Michel Foucault’s notion of “biopower” 
(2004, 22) and Agamben’s concept of the “state of exception” (2005), directing our 
attention to the myth of the enemy, of the terrorist, and the politics of death in a 
state of exception.
The history of violence against Muslims in independent India is a fundamental 
premise of the Hindu nation and of Indian politics. The making of hindutva (Hinduness) 
out of India’s incredibly varied traditions would not be possible without staging an 
“intimate enemy” (Nandy 2009), like Ravan the arch-demon against Ram the heroic 
deity in the epic known as the Ramayana. The origin of the Indian secular state lies in 
a violent conflict between Hindus and Muslims that led to the Partition of India and 
Pakistan and caused the displacement of around fourteen million people and the loss 
of hundreds of thousands of lives. The traumatic series of events from which Pakistan 
and India emerged continues to bedevil the relations between the two countries as 
well as between the Hindus and Muslims who live there. A number of wars followed 
the Partition, the most important of which was the 1971 war in which Bangladesh 
seceded from Pakistan (Korom, this volume). In India, a system of riots has emerged 
especially around elections, mostly targeting Muslims (Brass 2003).
Indian secularism
India is generally seen as a secular state, although the constitution does not proclaim 
it as such. The landmark assessment of the secularism of the Indian state is Donald 
Eugene Smith’s India as a Secular State (1963). He distinguishes three distinct but 
interrelated sets of relationships concerning the state, religion, and the individual. 
The three sets of relations are as follows:
1. religion and the individual (freedom of religion)
2. the state and the individual (citizenship)
3. the state and religion (separation of state and religion)
I am only concerned with number 1 in this article. Article 25 (1) of India’s 
constitution deals with individual freedom of religion:
Subject to public order, morality and health and to the other provisions of this 
Part, all persons are equally entitled to freedom of conscience and the right freely 
to profess, practice and propagate religion.
In an elaborate comment on Smith’s book, Marc Galanter (1998, 258) observes that 
Smith understands freedom of religion not as freedom of religion “as it is” in India but 
freedom of religion “as it ought to be.” He rightly points out that the constitution and, 
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even more, so the analysis of Donald Smith both show the spirit of Hindu reformism 
and the essential interventional mission of the modern developmental state.
The secular state intervenes in religious practice, for example, by prohibiting 
the practice of untouchability. As Galanter succinctly puts it, “Secularism cannot 
be entirely neutral among religions when it undertakes to confine them to their 
proper sphere” (1998, 259). “Proper sphere” here is certainly what, according to the 
theory of modernization, would be the result of a process of secularization. This was 
indeed what important nationalists such as Jawaharlal Nehru (1889–1964) and even 
Muhammad Ali Jinnah (1876–1948) hoped for, but while there is secularism in India, 
there is hardly secularization. There are attempts by Nehru and others to see India 
as a civilization and to see tolerance as a typical quality of that civilization. In fact, 
however, there is no unified civilization within the Indian Subcontinent, but only 
a wide variety of Hindu and Muslim traditions. Communities are not in themselves 
tolerant of each other but attempt to be self-regulating while perceiving others 
in the spirit of hierarchical relativism. In the colonial period self-regulation and 
hierarchical relativism become impossible to maintain in a newly minted national 
polity, although Mohandas Gandhi’s writings make continuous references to it. 
Religious communities come under the sway of colonial regulations and anticolonial 
nationalism. In the imperial encounter, Hinduism has been made into a majority 
religion by nationalism, and as a public religion it cannot easily be relegated to the 
private sphere of individual belief.
A pertinent question asked by Partha Chatterjee (1998) in the context referred to 
above is the following: is secularism an adequate, or even appropriate, ground on 
which to meet the political challenge of Hindu majoritarianism? It is indeed striking 
that the Hindu nationalists of the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), the ruling party in 
India today, have not attacked the secular state. Instead, they have argued that their 
rivals in the Congress Party are “pseudo-secularists,” suggesting thereby that they 
themselves are the genuine secularists. How does one square that suggestion with 
the undeniable fact that the current prime minister of India (then the chief minister 
of Gujarat) condoned (and allegedly orchestrated) the pogrom on Muslims in Gujarat 
during 2002? The answer to that question lies in the fact that the institutions of 
the secular state (police, judiciary) can be used to marginalize and even victimize 
a religious minority. The Indian brand of secularism is in itself not adequate in 
protecting the Muslim community in India.
The Congress Party kept radical anti-minority Hindu majoritarianism at bay until 
the 1980s. Starting with campaigns against the conversion of Dalits to Islam in the 
early 1980s, however, the RSS (Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh) developed an issue-
oriented political mobilization against Muslims. I witnessed the start of a campaign 
“to liberate Ram’s birthplace” in Ayodhya in 1984 (van der Veer 1988). The mosque 
that was allegedly built on the destroyed birthplace of Ram by the first Mughal 
Emperor Babar was already contested as far back as 1949, when an image of Ram had 
appeared miraculously inside the mosque named after him. Given the devastating 
conflicts and population movements surrounding the Partition, Nehru’s government 
decided to deny both Hindu and Muslim communities access to the mosque except 
for one day annually when a Hindu committee allowed local Hindus to enter the 
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mosque to worship there in commemoration of the day of the deity’s appearance. 
This was still the case in 1984 and continued to be the case till the destruction of the 
mosque by Hindu nationalists (RSS, VHP [Vishva Hindu Parishad], and BJP) in 1992.
Widespread rioting in India, the most important being in Mumbai, followed the 
destruction of the mosque. Mumbai is often regarded as a space of secular modernity 
and therefore different from the rest of the Indian nation. As a center of transnational 
trading it is connected to various “hinterlands” engendering a particular sense of 
religious cosmopolitanism. Wealthy Muslim trader groups, like the Bohras and the 
Khojas, are connected to the Middle East and Africa as well. Other trading groups 
like Gujarati Hindus or Jains, especially prominent in the diamond trade, as well as 
Parsis, originally prominent in the lucrative opium trade with China, but currently 
the largest private landowners in Mumbai, all have partly overlapping networks that 
are both religious and economic. This goes to say that Mumbai can be seen as a site 
that connects several spatial and religious imaginaries that are ritually expressed in 
the staging of the Muharram and Ganapati processions, the former being Muslim and 
the latter being Hindu (Green 2011).
The Muharram and Ganapati processions are the largest citywide mobilizations 
of people, but there are numerous smaller processions organized every day. In a 
city with huge infrastructural problems, these mass events that attract hundreds of 
thousands or even millions to the streets cause major traffic disruptions but at the 
same time fill people with purpose and affect. Hindus throughout India worship the 
elephant-headed god Ganesh or Ganapati on the special day that is devoted to him, 
but in Maharashtra, the state in which Mumbai is located, public rituals supplement 
the domestic ones practiced elsewhere. Historically, these public rituals were 
initiated under the leadership of one of the most important nationalist ideologues, 
Bal Gangadhar Tilak (1856–1920), at the end of nineteenth century, in order to unify 
Hindus by bridging the gap between Brahmans and non-Brahmans. This unification 
by ritual of a Hindu nation implied opposition to British rule in the colonial period 
but also opposition to the Muslim Other.
In the postcolonial period only the antagonism toward Muslims has remained. 
In cities like Mumbai, with an important Muslim community, the processions of 
Muharram (Muslim) and those of Ganapati (Hindu) more and more became ritual 
expressions of competition for space and power. Ritual competition then morphed 
into riotous confrontations in 1992. Even events far from the city led to large-scale 
rioting and communal violence in Mumbai, in which hundreds of Muslims were killed, 
with passive or sometimes active support from the police. These events continue to 
poison the structures of feeling that earlier characterized the city. Cities like Mumbai 
have become the privileged platforms for nationwide mobilization around sensitive 
issues, partly because people from everywhere in India have migrated to Mumbai and 
are in touch with what happens “back home,” especially after the emergence of cell 
phones and social media.
Muslim trading connects Mumbai via old mercantile routes to Karachi and Dubai 
(Green 2011). Such connections showed up in a dramatic fashion in a series of bomb 
blasts in 1993, discussed in the following paragraphs. An important aspect of trading 
in Mumbai is the so-called ḥavāla system, which is the unofficial transfer of money 
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by money-carriers. This form of indigenous person-to-person banking supports 
much of the trade, especially in gold, silver, and diamonds, and Muslim traders have 
privileged access to the Muslim hinterland. Obviously, organized crime is part of this 
world of trade connections, although it is not synonymous with it. In retaliation for 
the killings of hundreds of Muslims by Hindu mobs in Mumbai during 1992, a series 
of bomb explosions took place in Mumbai in 1993, targeting conspicuous buildings 
like the Stock Exchange and the Air India Building. A Mumbai criminal gang that 
was connected to Pakistan and the Gulf, and whose leaders had moved to Dubai and 
Karachi after the blasts, executed these bombings (Robbins 2006).
The campaign to cleanse Indian history of Islamic monuments has not yet 
succeeded in getting a temple built on the ruins of Babar’s mosque, but it has certainly 
succeeded in transforming the Hindu nationalist party into a national party that was 
able to defeat the Congress in a series of elections down to the present. Despite the 
1992 demolition of the mosque, no temple has been built even now, twenty-five years 
later. The issue remains enmeshed in the judicial process, despite the BJP’s political 
dominance. It is reasonable to suggest that the BJP is not terribly keen on pushing the 
issue, since keeping it simmering is more profitable in electoral terms.
An excellent illustration of keeping the controversy alive is the events that 
occurred in Gujarat during 2002. Narendra Modi declared, apparently without any 
evidence, that the burning of a train carrying Hindu pilgrims was a pre-planned 
attack. In addition, he claimed that the so-called “Godhra incident” was not a 
communal one at all, but a one-sided collective act of violent terrorism originating 
from one single community (Ghassem-Fachandi 2012, 59). In his account of the 2002 
pogrom in Gujarat, Parvis Ghassem-Fachandi (ibid.) has argued that Modi deliberately 
made the incident into an act of terrorism against the Hindu nation by a minority 
that did not belong there and only pledged allegiance to the enemy state of Pakistan.
Ghassem-Fachandi points to three elements of signification that licensed the 
widespread participation in and consent for the killing of Muslims. First, a rumor 
appears that Muslims abducted Hindu women out of the train. Again, no evidence 
was produced, but the story was carried in Gujarati newspapers, some of which made 
it into a report about Hindu girls being taken as sacrificial victims by Muslim ghosts. 
Second, there was a deliberate use of the language of Hindu sacrifice to convey an 
oblation into fire (homa). Third, excessive use of photography was deployed to depict 
brutalized women and children, which in Ghassem-Fachandi’s interpretation creates 
a mix of attraction and disgust. All of this created an atmosphere in which a Hindu 
majority was formed that could not escape being implicated in the violence without 
necessarily having participated in it. This majority carried Modi to electoral success.
Another objective of Modi’s rhetorical move to brand the attacks as terrorism was 
also to connect them to the founding violence of the Indian nation, the Partition. 
During my first visits to India in the 1970s, the memory of the Partition was hardly 
ever invoked, except for some matter-of-fact references. In the 1980s, however, 
this gradually changed. Not only scholarly and autobiographical accounts started 
to appear, like Urvashi Butalia’s The Other Side of Silence (1998) and Gyan Pandey’s 
Remembering Partition (2001), but more generally people began to openly refer to their 
experiences during that grim period of India’s colonial history. The Ayodhya conflict, 
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seen in this specific context, had put into question the secular and progressive history 
of independent India.
Nationalism and democracy
If we think of what happens in India today under the banner of the Modi government 
as a “crisis of democracy,” we have to realize that rather than a “crisis” of democracy 
it is the “product” of democracy. The BJP has been democratically successful by 
instigating violence. Showing oneself to be a strong leader in India by killing scores 
of people is not an uncommon strategy for electoral success. In Uttar Pradesh (UP), 
a state with approximately 220 million inhabitants (if it were a separate country, it 
would be the fifth country in terms of population, before Brazil or Pakistan), where 
Ayodhya is located, the BJP has also been victorious.
UP is now led by Chief Minister Yogi Adityanath, the Hindu abbot of the Gorakhnath 
Math in Gorakhpur, and the disciple and successor of Swami Avaidyanath, whom I 
knew as a firebrand during the Ayodhya agitations. Politics in UP, as in many other 
Indian states, revolves around specific caste or caste clusters (Brahmans, Thakurs, 
Yadavs, and Dalits) and around religion (Hindus, Muslims). The equations (and 
coalitions) are constantly shifting, reminding us of Ernest Renan’s (1823–1892) 
dictum that the nation state is a daily plebiscite (Renan 1996). Hindu nationalism has 
been around since the end of the nineteenth century and only now has the BJP been 
able to capture this central state (and some of the regional ones more firmly). Hindu 
nationalism is an integral element in Indian politics that has been ideologically and 
organizationally used to bring the BJP to power, but it would be a mistake to believe 
that the Congress Party did not use it as well. It would also be a mistake to think that 
only the innovative use of religious symbolism has brought the BJP to power, since 
politics is a constellation of conjectural forces, including importantly the decline 
of the so-called “Congress System of Patronage.” However, religious symbolism did 
play a major role in mobilizing people for a pro-Hindu/anti-Muslim cause, which also 
galvanized electoral politics.
Obviously, nationalism (like religion) acquires some of its hegemonic force by 
claiming that it only “awakens” or “revitalizes” what is always already present; 
namely, a unified nation. It constantly fights both against its internal and external 
enemies, as well as against processes of fragmentation. Region, language, history, 
caste, and class, as well as religion, can all be used both to unify and to diversify. Their 
alignments are conjectural and are sometimes produced by political strategy, as in 
the case with the alliterative Mandal (caste reservations) versus Mandir (temple) 
opposition. In fact, in 1984 not much attention was given to the campaign to liberate 
Ram’s birthplace. The moment was captured by the assassination of Indira Gandhi in 
1984 by her Sikh bodyguards (now widely seen as martyrs by the Sikh community), 
who killed her because she had given the order to launch Operation Blue Star against 
the Sikh holiest of holies, the Golden Temple in Amritsar, which harbored Khalistani 
separatists. Her assassination was followed by a Congress Party–led pogrom against 
the Sikh minority. Sikh separatism does not get very many headlines today, but it did 
in the 1980s, so it is useful to remind ourselves of the jigsaw movement of nationalism.
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The dominance of the BJP in recent elections in India has fostered the idea that 
secularism in India has declined and religious nationalism increased. This is partly, 
but not entirely, the case. It might be useful to consider that the Congress Party for 
the longest time has been able to keep many factions, including religious nationalist 
forces, contained within itself. Gandhi, for example, was a Hindu nationalist, but 
because of his broad understanding of nationalism he was murdered by Hindu 
nationalists who held a stronger anti-Muslim stance.
The BJP has always seen the secularism of the Congress Party as “pseudo-secular,” 
as mentioned earlier, due to the “pampering” of minorities, while portraying 
itself as truly secular. Whatever the interpretation of this rhetoric, it is clear that 
secularism is not a straightforward term. Moreover, the temple-mosque conflict in 
Ayodhya (and similar ones in nearby Banaras and Mathura) had been simmering for 
several decades. It was only in the late 1980s that the movement to “do something 
about it” gained momentum. No doubt, something changed, a rearrangement of the 
configuration formed by secularism and religious nationalism, but many elements 
had been there already for quite a long time (van der Veer 1994). It is a constantly 
negotiated arrangement that takes place primarily in the courts but can be taken to 
the streets when a community is made to feel that it is not fairly treated.
Conclusion
If the Indian sovereign nation has its roots in violence against Muslims, what is the 
place of secularism? One important mode of Indian secularism is that it can be used 
as a strategy to avoid or contain communal violence. In that respect, Gandhi can be 
understood as a secular Hindu. Secularism as a political project of the pacification 
of religious differences in society is historically also fundamental in the emergence 
of the European nation state. The Reformation stands out as the first period in 
European—and possibly global—history when religious refugees became a mass 
phenomenon. After the Jews and the Muslims came the Puritans who settled in the 
United States, the Anabaptists, the Huguenots, and everyone else who fled during 
the several wars of religion that followed the Reformation. As Nicholas Terpstra 
argues in Religious Wars in the Early Modern World (2015), the Reformation was not 
just a movement for intellectual and religious change. It was also Europe’s first 
grand project in social purification. Its adherents were deeply concerned with exile, 
expulsion, and refugees. The forced movement of religious migration was a normal, 
familiar, and expected feature of public policy that was conceived to build a cohesive 
society. The formula of cuius region, eius religio (“whose realm, whose religion”) was 
a principle that legitimized a combination of migration and war. At the end of the 
Thirty Years War, the Peace of Westphalia in 1648 built a fragile international system 
to deal with the treatment of minorities. Political scientists and historians generally 
interpret this treaty as the basis of the sovereign nation state. In Europe, therefore, 
the nation state has been built upon violence and the possible resolution of violence 
by separation and cleansing. Nevertheless, the German lands continued to be sites of 
huge migration to Eastern Europe (including Russia) and to the United States. Some 
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forty-four million people of German descent live in the United States alone, according 
to the US Census Bureau (2016).
This scenario is the deep history of modern nationalism. The idea of purification 
by expulsion became a legitimate aspect of statecraft, combining ethnic and religious 
cleansing. In the German case, Lutheran Protestantism became part of German 
nationalism in the nineteenth century, but one does not need religion for the 
cleansing of the nation. The two competing totalitarian ideologies of the twentieth 
century, Nazism and Communism took up where the religious wars had left off. The 
collapse of the Habsburg Empire and Czarist Russia gave rise to an unprecedented 
un-mixing of populations. Cleansing was both by expulsion and by extermination. 
Nazi and Soviet regimes from 1933 to 1945 murdered fourteen million people 
between Berlin and Moscow. These were all civilians, abandoned to state power, 
which reminds us that the state protects some, but attacks others.
Nationalism is not primarily about rationality and freedom. It is as much about 
violence and sacrifice, about sex and gender, about desire and excess. A nationalism 
to counter the current xenophobic nationalism of the BJP would not be based on the 
superiority of its enlightened politics but on a passion that would mobilize people 
against the destruction of their neighbors and their property. One of the interesting 
developments in Gujarat is that Gandhian nonviolence and satyāgraha (holding on to 
truth) has deteriorated into anti-Muslim vegetarianism (Spodek 1989). Nationalism is 
embodied (Alter 2000), as Frank J. Korom also shows to be the case in his article included 
in this collection. It is thus the Hindu understanding of the hierarchy and interaction 
of bodies or, more precisely, bodily fluids that is central to both violence and 
nonviolence. This visceral nationalism cannot be comprehended from liberal, political 
theory but requires close attention to affects that connect bodies to sovereignty.
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